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Preface 
 
The crisis which originated in the US financial sector in 2007 and subsequently spread to 
the real economy caused severe economic and social damage around the world. 
Governments have responded by providing fiscal support to the economy, undertaking 
exceptional monetary policy measures and introducing programmes targeted to 
vulnerable groups. In addition, considerable efforts have been made to recapitalise banks.  
  
Important as they are, these measures do not tackle the deeper influence of financial 
markets and institutions in the operation of the real economy. The purpose of this paper is 
to highlight the need for reforms in this neglected area.  
  
The paper confirms the finding of the World of World Report 2009 that the financial 
sector has grown beyond reasonable boundaries and its practices have spread to the non-
financial economy. For example, in the last 20 years, financial sector’s share of total 
corporate profits doubled, reaching as high as 44 per cent in 2002.  
  
The study also demonstrates that in the United States, the growing influence of the 
financial sector has led to a reduction in the share of business investment as a percent of 
value added by as much as 2 percentage points in the last three decades.   
  
More research is needed to shed further light on the causal linkages and to identify the 
reforms that could help ensure that the financial sector encourages investment --thereby 
growth and employment-- rather than hurting it. However, the finding of this paper is 
suggestive and important for today’s debate on sustainable crisis responses.     
 
 
 
Raymond Torres 
Director 
International Institute for Labour Studies
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A. Introduction1 
More than 20 million jobs were lost because of the financial and economic crisis of 2008-09, 
governments spent trillions of dollars in rescuing their financial systems and putting in place 
economic stimulus programmes, and by most recent estimates the total cost of the crisis is likely to 
amount to US$ 12 trillion. However, the factors that led to the crisis – deregulation, lack of proper 
government oversight, low interest rates, global savings imbalance, promotion of home ownership etc. 
– have not been properly addressed, notably those related to the financial sector. The financial sector 
has grown considerably in the past three decades, and a closer examination of the trends reveals that 
this growth had become unsustainable. It is true that finance enables the real economy to function 
properly by channelling capital resources to its most productive use and financial intermediaries play 
the role of collecting and disbursing resources. Furthermore, cross-country evidence shows that 
financial development is associated with economic growth and job creation. But the growth in the 
financial sector cannot be for its own sake, it would have to be for the sake of enabling growth in the 
real economy.  
One of the ways of looking at the growth of the financial sector and its increasing influence on the rest 
of the economy is to examine the evolution of profits in the financial sector (Stockhammer, 2004; 
Krippner, 2005; Johnson, 2009; Torres, 2010). In particular, the financial sector’s share of corporate 
profits has doubled in a span of 20 years (Johnson, 2009; Freeman, 2010; Torres, 2010).  While it is 
true that measurement of profits over time is subject to a high degree of uncertainty, evidence shows 
that corporate profits have trended upwards since the 1980s in most developed economies (Ellis and 
Smith, 2007). This result holds by looking at either the profit share (gross operating surplus as a 
percentage of GDP) or the net rate of return on capital (gross operating surplus less depreciation of 
capital as a percentage of total net capital). With the rising corporate profits, evidence shows that the 
share of corporate profits going to the financial sector has increased tremendously. In other words, the 
rate of growth of financial sector profit has been much higher than that of the rest of the economy. 
This trend holds for the U.S. and the developed economies of Europe.  
Rising corporate profits and the financial sector taking an increasing share of it is not a problem in 
itself. Actually, more profits should go to the sector whose value added to the GDP is higher. That is 
how a capitalist economic system is expected to function and should function. It is true that the value 
added of the financial sector to GDP exhibits a strong upward trend, but, in the wake of the financial 
and economic crisis of 2008-09, economists have started asking the question: did the financial sector 
grow disproportionately (Adrian and Shin, 2009; Krugman, 2009; Stiglitz, 2009; Freeman, 2010; 
Rajan, 2010; Torres, 2010). In other words, could it be true that the increased importance of financial 
sector has had negative consequences on the real economy?  
In order to examine this question we look at the impact of increased financial sector profit on private 
business investment in the United States. Variations in business investment expenditures have long-
term consequences for the productive capacity of the economy, and it also leads to shifts in the 
aggregate levels of employment and personal income (Samuel, 1996). The rest of the paper is 
organized as follows: section B looks at the growth in the financial sector by looking at past trends in 
profits and wages, and provides an in-depth look at where the increased profits have gone; section C 
examines the impact of financial sector’s rising share of profits on private business investment. 
     
                                                 
 
1
 The author would like to thank Ekkehard Ernst and Raymond Torres for valuable comments.  
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B. Overview of past trends 
Rising profits 
Financial sector’s share of corporate profit in the United States has doubled in the span of two decades 
(Figure 1). From 1960 to 1984, financial sector’s share of total corporate profit averaged 17.4 per 
cent, but from 1985 to 2008, it averaged roughly 30 per cent. From 2001 to 2003, it was above 40 per 
cent, reaching as high as 44 per cent in 2002.    
 
Figure 1: The rising incidence of profits in the US financial sector (as a percent of total 
corporate profits) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on US Bureau of Economic Analysis.   
 
Given the rising incidence of corporate profits across all sectors, it is not surprising that the financial 
sector profits have increased as well. However, the notable difference is that the profit of the financial 
sector has been increasing at a faster pace than the rest of the economy, namely the non-financial 
sector. For example, in the United States, when in comparing the financial and non-financial sector 
profit as a percentage of their valued added to the economy, we see that starting in 1985, profits in the 
financial sector grew much faster (Figure 2). Furthermore, when corporate profits took declined 
rapidly in late 1990s and early 2000s, financial sector profit remained remarkably stable.      
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Figure 2: Financial and non-financial sector profit as a percentage of their valued added 
to the US economy, 1960-2008 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on US Bureau of Economic Analysis.  
 
Widening wage gap  
As profits accruing to the financial sector grew, the wage gap between financial and non-financial 
firms widened. Studies have shown that, compared to the non-financial sector in the United States, 
wages in the financial sector increased considerably from the 1980s to 2000s and, in the case of 
executives, was not linked to firm performance (World of Work Report 2008). Before the 2008 crisis 
and the Great Depression, “the compensation of employees in the financial industry appeared too high 
to be consistent with a sustainable labour market equilibrium” (Philippon and Reshef, 2009).2 For 
example, controlling for education level and other observable characteristics, employees in the 
financial sector during the 1970s earned 3 to 4 per cent more than employees in the rest of the private 
sector (Philippon and Reshef, 2007). However, in the post-1980s world of deregulation and 
innovation, the wage premium in the financial sector rose to 20 per cent. Furthermore, a more recent 
study by Philippon and Reshef (2009) finds a robust and economically positive effect of deregulation 
on wages in the financial sector. It shows that financiers in the United States have been “overpaid by 
30 to 50 percent since the late 1990s”.  
The analysis reveals that the real wage gap between financial and non-financial firms in the United 
States widened from US$ 11,000 in 1987 to US$ 40,000 in 2007 (per annum per employee; Figure 3). 
These past trends in compensation in the financial sector have continued throughout 2008 and 2009. 
For example, recipients of government bailout money through the Troubled Asset Relief Program 
(TARP) paid handsome bonuses to their employees in 2008. Citigroup, Merrill Lynch (which does not 
exist anymore) and Wells Fargo paid bonuses, even while enduring massive losses. In the case of 
                                                 
 
2
 During the 1970s, when employees in the financial sector earned 3 to 4 per cent more than employees in the 
rest of the private sector, they also enjoyed substantially lower unemployment risk. However, after 1980, 
unemployment risk in the financial sector started to catch with the rest of the private sector and the wage 
premium also increased to 20 per cent. Half of the increase in wage premium is accounted for by the increase in 
unemployment risk, but the other half is not explainable (Philippon and Reshef, 2007).  
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Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan Chase and Morgan Stanley, bonus payment per employee exceeded 
earnings per employee.  
 
Figure 3: Real wage gap between financial and non-financial firms in the US 
 
Notes: The figures give real average compensation per employee, and therefore do not take into account 
changes in the incidence of part-time employment. This may partly explain the changes in real wages 
between 1996 and 1997 in the US non-financial sector. However it is unlikely that changes in part time 
affect the relative trends of financial sector real wages versus non-financial sector real wages. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).   
 
Disproportionate use of resources  
As the financial sector grew in size, it often attracted the best and the brightest. For example, among 
the Master of Business Administration (MBA) graduates from the top ten business schools in the 
world (which includes universities in China, France, the United Kingdom and the United States), 40 
per cent of the graduates took jobs in the financial sector, while 60 per cent took jobs in the non-
financial sector (World of Work Report, 2009). For some years, for example 2002/03, the breakdown 
was 50:50. Even after adjusting for the self-selection bias of students going into business schools, it is 
evident that the financial sector has been receiving a disproportionate share of the best and the 
brightest graduates. Longer time series data, available for a few business schools, show that, in the 
1990s and 2000s, the share of graduates taking jobs in the financial sector is significantly higher than 
during the 1970s and 1980s. The general trend mimics the increasing size and influence of the 
financial sector in the real economy.  
Nobel laureate James Tobin warned us more than two decades ago that the financial sector was using 
a disproportionate share of our resources: 
I confess to an uneasy Physiocratic suspicion, perhaps unbecoming in an academic, that we are 
throwing more and more of our resources, including the cream of our youth, into financial 
activities remote from the production of goods and services, into activities that generate high 
private rewards disproportionate to their social productivity. I suspect that the immense power of 
the computer is being harnessed to this ‘paper economy’, not to do the same transactions more 
economically but to balloon the quantity and variety of financial exchanges - James Tobin, pp.14-
15, 1984.     
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Despite his belief in the power of unfettered markets, Tobin understood that financial sector growth 
came (or could come) at a cost to the rest of the economy. Indeed, when examining the real private 
business investment as a percent of its value added, there has been a 2 percentage points decline in 
investment in the last three decades (Figure 4). Stockhammer (2004) shows that “financialization”, 
which the author defines as “increased activity of non-financial businesses on financial markets”, 
leads to a slowdown in accumulation of physical assets, that is, lower investment activity.    
 
Figure 4 : Real private business investment as a percent of value added 
 
Source: Authors calculations based on US Bureau of Economic Analysis.  
 
 
Financialization of non-financial firms 
Not only has the financial sector absorbed a disproportionate and growing share of valuable resources 
but, in addition, its practices and values have penetrated the non-financial economy. This is because 
firms have increasingly been managed according to the reporting rules and short-term goals of capital 
markets. Corporate managers have adopted the behaviour of the financial markets and, as a result, 
their interests are more closely aligned with those of financiers than with the real economy (Epstein, 
2005; Krippner, 2005; Krugman, 2009; Palley 2009; Stockhammer, 2007; Stiglitz, 2009).  
When looking at the influence of financial sector in the operation of nonfinancial corporations 
(NFCs), three broad patterns emerge: (i) increased investment in financial assets (Figure 5); (ii) 
increasing share of income from financial sources; and, (iii) and higher amounts of payments (in the 
form of dividend payments, interest payments, and stock buybacks) to capital markets (Milberg, 2007; 
Ozgur, 2007). NFCs earn better returns in capital markets, which then crowds out real investment. 
Moreover, the gap between the rate of return on manufacturing investment and the rate of return on 
financial investments has widened in the last two decades. Traditionally non-financial firms have 
become more like financial companies, with a spectrum of financial services and financial 
investments (Milberg, 2007).  
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Figure 5: Financial assets as a per cent of tangible assets for the US non-financial 
corporations, 1945-2008 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on Flow of Funds Data, US Bureau of Economic Analysis.     
 
An important indicator of the capital markets’ growing influence in the real economy is the evolution 
of dividend practices. In the past several decades, the distribution of profits between interest 
payments, dividends and retained earnings has been drastically modified. The reduction of debt by 
firms during the 1980s and 1990s has led to a decreasing share of interest payments into profits net of 
taxes from 70 per cent in 1980 to 50 per cent in 2007. However, the decline in interest payments has 
not produced an increase in retained earnings, as dividends have increased. Retained earnings stayed 
constant at around 18 per cent of profits after taxes, while the share of dividends has increased from 
20 per cent in 1990 to 40 per cent in 2007. Dividends as a percentage of total profits in the United 
States doubled from 22.8 per cent in 1946–1979 to 46.3 per cent in 1980–2008 (Figure 6).  
 
Did the financial sector profit at the expense of the rest of the economy?  DP 206 
 
7 
 
 
Figure 6: Evolution of dividends in the US (as a percent of total profits) 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on Flow of Funds Data, US Bureau of Economic Analysis.    
 
This trend cannot be explained by a changing pattern in financing investment, as new stocks represent 
scarcely 3.8 per cent of new security issues. On the contrary, a possible explanation might be the deep 
institutional transformations that have taken place at firm level since the 1970s. These transformations 
have led to the increasing power of shareholders. The share of profits distributed to shareholders has 
therefore increased from 30 per cent of corporate profits before tax in 1990 to 48 per cent in 2002. 
The transformations in the financial sphere have altered the bargaining power within firms. Although 
shareholders support the risk ex ante, they have been able to reduce the risk they support ex post. Part 
of the risk has been transferred to employees and managers through flexible labour contracts and 
flexible wage income.  
 
Executive pay in line with financial interests   
Changes in the composition of pay, especially at the executive level, have further strengthened the 
influence of capital markets over non-financial firms. As discussed in World of Work Report 2008, 
although annual salaries have been increasing, the proportion of total pay that they represent has 
decreased in the past 20 years, while compensation through stock options has become the most 
important component, increasing from 35 per cent to 77 per cent (Jarque, 2008). Leverage in 
compensation – where incentives pay outweighs salary – has increased tremendously over the years, 
which in turn has increased risk taking. For example, in 1987, a short-term incentive award was 60 
per cent of an average executive’s salary and a long-term incentive award was two times the salary 
but, in 2008, short-term incentive awards comprised 200 per cent of the salary and long-term 
incentives accounted for eight times the salary.3 While it is true that tying executive pay to stock 
options tends to lead to increased sensitivity of pay to performance, it also tends to encourage short-
termism – that is, a singular focus on quarterly earnings.     
                                                 
 
3
 G. Morgenson, “The quick buck just got quicker”, in The New York Times, 16 Aug. 2009.  
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Decline in wage share and collective bargaining  
Rising corporate profits is associated with decline in wage share and a reduction in the bargaining 
power of labour (see: Ellis and Smith, 2007; OECD Economic Outlook 82). As the World of Work 
Report 2009 showed, for the five most financialized countries (that is, higher the share of corporate 
profits going to finance, the more financialized a country is), wage share declined by 3.6 per cent over 
the period 1989 to 2005, while for the five least financialized countries, wage share declined by 2 per 
cent. More generally, the decline in the wage share can be partly ascribed to the growing pressures 
from capital markets for quicker and better returns.4 Meanwhile, for the five least unionized advanced 
economies, the percentage change in finance’s share of corporate profit was the highest, while for the 
five least unionized, the percentage change in finance’s share of corporate profit was the lowest. In 
other words, countries with the highest union densities saw the lowest increase in financialization 
while countries with the lowest union densities saw the greatest increase in financialization.  
There are several other factors like decline in corporate investment, increased corporate savings, 
lower interest charges etc. that have led to the rise in corporate profits, but most of these factors are 
likely to subside over time and follow business cycles. However, the structural factors like wage 
moderation and labour’s decline in bargaining for a larger share of income are likely to persist. The 
next section examines whether the financial sector taking an increasing share of corporate profits 
contributed to a downward trend in real investment in the United States.   
C. Emprical framework, data, and results   
The literature on determinants of investment is vast, and the goal of the paper is not to contribute to 
the debate on investment theory. Instead, it places itself in the literature that tries to better understand 
financial sector’s increased dominance in the real economy and its likely consequences on economic 
output and employment (Stockhammer, 2004; Epstein, 2005; Krippner, 2005; Stockhammer, 2007; 
Palley, 2009; Stiglitz, 2009; Freeman, 2010).  
First, it is important to draw out some of the primary determinants of private business investment, 
both at the firm level and at the aggregate level. The most commonly used model is the Q theory of 
investment (Tobin, 1969; Wildasin, 1984; Galeotti and Schiantarelli, 1991; Schaller, 1990). It states 
that a firm should invest if the discounted value of future profits from an extra unit of capital exceeds 
the costs of acquiring it (Mac Gorain and Thompson, 2002). Meanwhile, several authors have shown 
that the rate of investment of a share-value maximizing firm is a function of q ratio (Yoshikawa, 
1980; Summers, 1981; Hayashi, 1982). But since these early papers, several caveats have been added, 
like allowing for heterogeneity in capital goods and refining the definition of q (like average vs. 
marginal q). However, Tobin’s Q fares poorly in empirical studies for its predictive power for 
aggregate investment (Mac Gorain and Thompson, 2002). But, without delving too much into the 
debate regarding the predictability of Tobin’s q in explaining investment, it is safe to assume that 
future profitability of a firm has an impact on investment, keeping in mind that there are several other 
considerations like cash flows and sales.      
Besides the Q theory of investment, there are several different theories of investment (accelerator, 
cash flow, neoclassical etc.) at the firm level. The neo-classical model – Jorgenson’s approach – is 
based on an explicit model of optimisation behaviour, which relates the desired capital stock to 
interest rates, output, capital prices, and tax policies (Jorgenson, 1963; du Toit and Moolman, 2004). 
But from the myriad of different models available in the literature, some of the primary determinants 
of investment are output, cash flows (retained earnings and depreciation), cost of capital, prices, 
technology shocks etc. (Samuel, 1996). The literature proving or disproving the relative merits of each 
                                                 
 
4
 See Chapter 1 of World of Work 2008 for a more detailed discussion of this wage share data.  
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determinant is extensive.5 But, the overall conclusion from this literature is that the empirical 
evidence lends support to an eclectic approach to the study of investment expenditure decisions at the 
firm level (Samuel, 1996).     
 
On the other hand, the literature on the determinants of investment at the macro level is sparse. 
However, it is safe to assume that some of the same determinants of investment at the firm level 
translate into investment decisions at the aggregate level, namely cost of finance, output, corporate 
profits, stock market etc. Bondt and Diron (2008), one of the few recent papers in this literature, show 
that costs of external finance (borrowing costs), the availability of internal sources of finance, and 
profit expectations matter greatly for aggregate investment. This result holds for different investment 
types – total investment and non construction investment – and regions – the United States and the 
Euro Area.  
 
Diron, Manzano, and Westermann (2005) look at the role of financial conditions in determining 
aggregate investment in the Euro Area. They assume (in line with the modern theory of finance) that 
there is a wedge between internal (cheaper) and external finance (more expensive), and this implies 
that future investment projects that have positive net present values might not be carried out or 
delayed because external funds being expensive and there is a lack of adequate internal funds. 
Meanwhile, Heim (2008) uses government deficits, depreciation, GDP growth, interest rate, a proxy 
for Tobin’s q, capacity utilization, exchange rate, and corporate profitability as determinants of 
demand for investment goods. 
 
Following from the above discussion of the investment literature, and loosely based on the variables 
used in Stockhammer (2004), the model used here relates annual private business investment as a 
percent of its valued added to the economy to its lagged value, growth rate of GDP, lagged long-term 
real interest rates (cost of finance), debt levels of the country, capacity utilization, and financial 
sector’s profit as a percent of its value added to the economy (Stockhammer, 2004). Variables are 
lagged to avoid simultaneity problem.  
 
                                                 
 
5
 See Samuel (1996) for an extensive discussion on the merits and demerits of different models of investment. 
The five models discussed in the paper are: i) accelerator theory; ii) cash flow theory; iii) neoclassical theory; 
iv) modified neoclassical theory; and v) Q theory.   
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The basic model looks like:  
 
(I/VA)t = α + β1 (I/VA)t-1 + β2 log Yt + β3 rt-1 + β4 log Dt + β5 CUt + β6  Πt + β7 Πt-1        (Eq. 1)     
 
I/VA
 
= real private business investment as a share of its value added;  
Y
 
= GDP in constant prices;  
r
 
= real interest rate; 
D
 
= debt as a proxy for “crowding out” effect on private investment; 
CU
 
= capacity utilization rate;   
Π
 
= financial sector’s share of corporate profit  
 
The expected signs on the estimators are: β1>0, β2>0, β3<0, β4<0, β5>0, β6<0 and β7<0    
 
There is no consensus in the literature regarding the time it takes for determinants of investment to 
actually impact invesmtent. In other words, determining the number of lags for the variables on the 
right hand side is not straightforward. In order to figure out the appropriate number of lags, we tested 
our model for different lags (-1 to -4) and chose the one that most explained variance in the model.    
 
The first differenced form looks like,  
 
∆(I/VA)t = β1∆(I/VA)t-1 + β2∆logYt + β3∆ rt-1 + β4∆logDt + β5∆CUt + β6∆Πt + β7∆Πt-1 (Eq. 2) 
 
where, ∆Yt = Yt – Yt-1  
First differencing increases stability (robustness) of our estimates because it reduces the 
intercorrelation between the determinants of investment.  
Meanwhile, it is important to understand corporate sector accounts before we start analyzing the profit 
data. Gross operating surplus is the commonly used measure of operating profit, which is the gross 
value added by the corporate sector minus compensation on employees and minus tax less subsidies 
on production. Profit before tax is another measure and it is operating profits (GOS) minus net interest 
paid, plus net property income received, and plus other current transfers received. Profits after tax 
takes into account the direct taxes paid by the corporate sector. Then the gross corporate saving is 
profits after tax minus dividends paid. Gross savings is basically equal to undistributed profits and 
fixed capital consumption  
But absolute measures of profits are not as useful for economic analysis, so the commonly used 
measure for economic analysis is profit share – the ratio of gross operating surplus to GDP. This is 
relevant for macroeconomic analysis because movements in profit share are primarily determined by 
the relative dynamics of GOS and labour costs.6 In our paper we use financial sector’s share of total 
corporate profits as a share of profit. The period examined in this paper is from 1960 to 2008, and the 
data is from the Economic Report of the U.S. President, which is an annual report that collects all 
statistics relevant to the U.S. economy.   
First, we use generalized least-squares (GLS) method to estimate the parameters to equation 1. Since 
we are working with time series data, we believe that errors in our linear regression are serially 
correlated. Specifically, the errors are assumed to follow a first-order autoregressive process, AR(1). 
Hence, we correct for this to get our estimates. The statistic that indicates the likelihood that error 
values for the regression have a AR(1) component is Durbin-Watson, also known as “Durbin Watson 
test for autocorrelation”. When we estimate equation 1, the regression model assumes that the error 
deviations are uncorrelated, hence it is important to correct for serial correlation before we come up 
with estimates. DW statistic of less than 0.80 usually indicates autocorrelation, and a value of 2 
                                                 
 
6
 See ECB monthly bulletin Jan. 2004 for an extensive discussion of different measures of profits.  
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indicates no autocorrelation.   
 
Table 1: Generalized least squares (GLS), assuming errors are serially correlated, AR (1) 
 Private business investment as a percent of its total value added 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Investment as a 
percent of its VA  
(-1) 
  -0.012 
(0.093) 
-0.012 
(0.097) 
 
log GDP 
 
15.36*** 
(2.42) 
14.58*** 
(2.14) 
14.76*** 
(2.54) 
14.70*** 
(2.71) 
14.57*** 
(2.19) 
real interest  
rate (-1) 
-0.39*** 
(0.07) 
-0.22*** 
(0.06) 
-0.22*** 
(0.073) 
-0.22*** 
(0.075) 
-0.22*** 
(0.060) 
log debt 
 
-13.85*** 
(1.85) 
-11.70*** 
(1.49) 
-11.78*** 
(1.58) 
-11.78*** 
(1.58) 
-11.69*** 
(1.52) 
Capacity 
utilization 
 0.18*** 
(0.04) 
0.18*** 
(0.044) 
0.18*** 
(0.044) 
0.18*** 
(0.041) 
Finance share of 
total corporate 
profits 
-0.096*** 
(0.034) 
-0.06** 
(0.027) 
-0.056** 
(0.027) 
-0.055* 
(0.031) 
-0.056* 
(0.031) 
Finance share of 
total corporate 
profits (-1) 
   -0.00 
(0.029) 
0.00 
(0.028) 
Constant -6.44 
(13.39) 
-33.1 
(13.44) 
-34.1 
(15.72) 
-34.1 
(17.01) 
 
Durbin Watson 
(original) 
0.84 
 
0.81 0.96 0.96 0.87 
 Durbin Watson 
(transformed) 
1.66 1.59 1.57 1.57 1.59 
R2 0.73 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 
Number of years 
included  
42 41 41 41 41 
Notes: * Significant at 0.10 level, ** significant at 0.05 level, *** significant at 0.01 level 
Standard errors are in parenthesis.  
 
Did the financial sector profit at the expense of the rest of the economy?  DP 206 
 
12 
 
 
 
Table 2: First-differenced form  
 Private business investment as a percent of its total value added 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
∆ Investment as a 
percent of its VA  
(-1) 
  -0.05 
(0.091) 
 -0.05 
(0.099) 
∆ log GDP 
 
40.91*** 
(7.31) 
31.87*** 
(9.24) 
32.49*** 
(9.39) 
31.75*** 
(9.39) 
32.49*** 
(9.60) 
∆ real interest  
rate (-1) 
-0.22*** 
(0.066) 
-0.16** 
(0.07) 
-0.14* 
(0.08) 
-0.15** 
(0.076) 
-0.13 
(0.09) 
∆ log debt 
 
-9.16*** 
(2.75) 
-8.49*** 
(2.71) 
-8.53*** 
(2.73) 
-8.44*** 
(2.76) 
-8.53*** 
(2.8) 
∆ Capacity 
utilization 
 0.11* 
(0.065) 
0.13* 
(0.07) 
0.12* 
(0.067) 
0.13* 
(0.071) 
∆ Finance share 
of total corporate 
profits 
-0.087*** 
(0.028) 
-0.065** 
(0.030) 
-0.061** 
(0.030) 
-0.067** 
(0.031) 
-0.06* 
(0.03) 
∆ Finance share 
of total corporate 
profits (-1) 
   0.006 
(0.029) 
-0.000 
(0.032) 
Constant -0.95 
(0.27) 
-0.65 
(0.321) 
-0.67 
(0.32) 
-0.66 
(0.33) 
-0.67 
(0.33) 
R2 0.80 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 
F statistic  37.93 31.82 26.05 25.79 21.68 
Number of years 
included  
42 41 41 41  41 
Notes: * Significant at 0.10 level, ** significant at 0.05 level, *** significant at 0.01 level 
Standard errors are in parenthesis.  
 
According to Table 1, a one percentage point increase in financial sector’s share of corporate profit 
increased is associated with a decline of investment rate (private business investment over its value 
added) by 0.06 to 0.09 percentage points, and the estimates are statistically significant at 1 or 5 
percent level. When we use first differencing, we get similar results (Table 2). This means that, had 
the financial profit rate remained constant for the past 20 years, the investment rate in the real 
economy would have increased by about 2 percentage points instead of following a mild downward 
trend. Higher real investment, in turn, would have boosted output and incomes. As we can see from 
Table 1 and Table 2, the signs of coefficient estimates for GDP, real interest rates, debt, and capacity 
utilization are as expected, and they are all statistically significant. Meanwhile, lagged investment and 
financial sector’s share of profit have no impact on investment.     
Conclusion  
In the United States financial sector’s share of corporate profits have doubled in a span of 20 years.  
Given the rising incidence of corporate profits across all sectors, it is not surprising that the financial 
sector profits have increased as well. However, the notable difference is that the profit of the financial 
sector has been increasing at a faster rate than the rest of the economy, namely the non-financial 
sector.  
As profits accruing to the financial sector grew, the wage gap between financial and non-financial 
firms widened. Furthermore, in the last two decades, financial sector has often attracted the best and 
the brightest. And not only has the financial sector absorbed a disproportionate and growing share of 
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valuable resources, but its practices and values have penetrated the non-financial economy. It seems 
that firms have increasingly been managed according to the reporting rules and short-term goals of 
capital markets.  All this has had a negative impact on the real economy, namely business investment: 
real private business investment as a percent of its value added declined by roughly 2 percentage 
points in the last 30 years. Did finance play a role in this downward trend? Our results show that it 
did. This means that, had the financial profit rate remained constant for the past 20 years, the 
investment rate in the real economy would have increased instead of following a mild downward 
trend, and higher real investment in turn would have boosted output and incomes.  
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